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CHAPTER X



JOINT ARMY-NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDY

OF

KOREA

(INCLUDING TSUSHIMA AND QUELPART)

PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT

APRIL 1945

List of Effective Pages, Chapter X

Subject Matter	Change in Effect	Page Numbers
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Note: This chapter is based upon material available in Washington, D. C., on 1 March 1945.

PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT

100. General Description

A. Population.

The population of Korea was officially estimated at nearly 25 million in 1941 and is now probably well over that figure. This total comprised in 1941 about 96.7% of Koreans, 2.9% Japanese, and 0.3% of other nationalities, chiefly Chinese.

Concentrated especially in the arable coastal plains and valleys on the southern and western margins of the peninsula, some 75% of the population maintains a meager existence by the practice of agriculture. Recently, however, an important movement from the farms toward the new industrial cities of the North and Northeast has taken place. The Japanese live chiefly in these cities (FIGURE X-12) and the large ports, serving as businessmen and technicians, or in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul), the capital, and other administrative centers as government officials.

B. Basic culture.

The Koreans are unified by a common language, a common culture, and a common historical tradition. The Korean language, related in vocabulary and structure to the tongues of Mongolia, has incorporated many Chinese words, and has long used Chinese characters. Korean is more commonly written, however, in *onmun*, an indigenous script understood by about half the Korean adults.

C. Chinese influence.

The northern ancestry of Korean civilization is evidenced by the survival of shaman religious practices among the country people, but the increasing predominance of Chinese culture has obliterated most traces of the primitive civilization. Chinese influence was first strongly felt through the Chinese control of central and western Korea established in 108 B.C. It was continued in the introduction of Buddhism to the several Korean kingdoms that contested the control of the peninsula in succeeding centuries, and consolidated under the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), under which Korea attained its present boundaries. This period saw the displacement of Buddhism in favor of Confucianism, with its bureaucracy of scholars and its concept of a world order of autonomous states under the loose suzerainty of a Chinese emperor. Culturally Korea became a part of China, and politically Korean rulers showed a remarkable allegiance to their Chinese suzerains, offering on several occasions armed resistance to the attempts of other nations to usurp suzerainty. Korea was not purely imitative, however. Certain periods have created art of a high order and distinct national character. Several native religions also have developed, one of them—Chondokyo—still retaining some importance.

D. Japanese influence.

The part of Japan in Korean history, although until recent years smaller than that of China, has also been significant. There were strong cultural similarities between the primitive Japanese and Korean civilizations. The two languages, though quite different in word stems, have a grammatical similarity. The early Japanese borrowing of Chinese culture and Buddhism was chiefly through Korea and was colored by Korean features.

For a short period in the 4th century the Japanese established a colony at the southern edge of the Korean peninsula, and played a part in Korean internal struggles. A thousand years later Korea became the springboard for ill-fated Mongol attempts to conquer Japan. At the end of the 16th century the Japanese General Hideyoshi attempted the conquest of Korea as a preliminary to that of China, but his troops were finally expelled by Chinese and Korean effort.

At the end of the 19th century, Korea's strategic geographic position once more made her a potential prize for imperialist powers. The house of Yi, after centuries of isolation, lacked the vigor to meet the new challenge, and China was impotent to protect her vassal state. The way to Japanese success in the contest for Korea was paved by her victory over China in 1895, with the consequent renunciation of Chinese suzerainty, and by the treaty of Portsmouth (1905) terminating the Russo-Japanese War and giving Japan a free hand in the peninsula. Within the next 5 years Japan successively assumed control of Korea's foreign affairs, established a Resident-General in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul), forced the abdication of the recalcitrant Korean Emperor in favor of his infant son, and in 1910 formally annexed Korea. The final subjection of the country was accomplished only after overcoming armed resistance and disarming the population. Henceforth Korea was ruled as a subject nation by a Japanese Governor-General, and every effort was made to assimilate the country culturally, politically, and economically. But although an attempt was made to gain the favor of the Korean ruling family and the aristocracy by the gift of titles, stipends, and other preferences, Korean national consciousness has steadily grown in intensity among all classes of the population, and Japanese rule has been maintained for the most part by strict police controls and armed force. The desire for independence has been increased rather than lessened by the higher level of popular education, the experience of more efficient administration, and the industrial development which Japanese rule has brought in its train, but in whose benefits the Koreans have had only a limited participation.

101. Size and Distribution of Population

A. Numbers.

The census of 1940 places the total population of Korea at 24,326,327, of whom 12,266,230 were male and 12,060,097 female. Official Japanese estimates for 1941 place the population at 24,703,897, including an estimated 716,911 Japanese and 73,823 other nationals, mostly Chinese. The present population is no doubt well over 25 million.

B. Distribution by area and density.

With a land area of 85,251 square miles, Korea in 1941 had a population density of 289.8 per square mile. (Compare the United States, 44.2; France, 184.8; Japan proper, 495; England, 742.) The densest average population is in the southern and southwestern coastal areas and valleys, where good rice fields are available. (FIGURE X-1 and TABLE X-1)

Since 1935 the debased standard of living on the farms, the opening of broader opportunities in Manchuria and Japan, and the demand for industrial workers in the northern cities of Korea have led to a definite migration away from this more congested southern area. Of the provinces which reported growth during 1937 through 1941, the northeastern province of Hamgyong-pukto, containing such important new war industrial and shipping centers as Unggi, Aoji-dong, Songjin, Kilchu, Najin, Ch'ongjin, Musan, and Hoeryong (TABLE X-2), enjoyed the most spectacular increase; this province had a 37% increase in population during the above 4 years.

TABLE X - 1

POPULATION BY PROVINCE, 1941
(Japanese estimate)

PROVINCE* Korean	PROVINCE* Japanese	TOTAL	KOREANS	JAPANESE	FOREIGNERS	PERCENT OF OF AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE 1937-1941	AREA (SQ. M.)	DENSITY OF POPULATION PER SQ. MI.
Kyonggi-do	Keiki-do	2,940,185	2,740,284	191,888	8,013	4.80	4,950	594.0
Ch'ungch'ong-pukto	Chusei-hokudo	911,672	902,160	9,135	377	.08	2,864	318.3
Ch'ungch'ong-namdo	Chusei-nando	1,582,108	1,554,284	26,818	1,006	1.12	3,130	505.5
Cholla-pukto	Zenra-hokudo	1,624,200	1,588,324	34,761	1,115	1.15	3,303	491.7
Cholla-namdo	Zenra-nando	2,656,543	2,611,482	44,434	627	2.03	5,362	495.4
Kyongsang-pukto	Keisho-hokudo	2,480,783	2,435,503	44,687	593	.33	7,332	338.3
Kyongsang-namdo	Keisho-nando	2,341,531	2,244,337	96,770	424	1.33	4,751	492.8
Hwanghae-do	Kokai-do	1,839,831	1,812,208	24,478	3,145	2.60	6,463	284.7
P'yongan-namdo	Heian-nando	1,694,697	1,639,870	48,420	6,407	3.80	5,770	293.7
P'yongan-pukto	Heian-hokudo	1,793,617	1,729,592	31,004	33,021	1.50	10,983	158.4
Kangwon-do	Kogen-do	1,747,852	1,726,305	20,576	971	4.40	10,140	172.3
Hamgyong-namdo	Kankyo-nando	1,936,717	1,858,472	69,931	8,314	4.60	12,374	156.5
Hamgyong-pukto	Kankyo-hokudo	1,154,161	1,070,242	74,109	9,810	9.30	7,856	146.9
Total		24,703,897	23,913,063	717,011	73,823	2.80	85,251	289.8

*NOTE: Korean *do* or *to* and Japanese *do* at end of name mean "province." Korean *pukto* and Japanese *hokudo* mean "northern province." Korean *namdo* and Japanese *nando* mean "southern province."

TABLE X - 2

POPULATION OF MUNICIPALITIES (*FU*), 1940

MUNICIPALITY Korean	MUNICIPALITY Japanese	PROVINCE*	TOTAL POPULATION 1940	PERCENT OF ANNUAL INCREASE 1937-1940	NUMBER OF JAPANESE 1939	PERCENT OF TOTAL JAPANESE POPULATION 1939
Kyongsong	Keijō	Kyonggi-do	935,464	10.7	138,023	17.8
Inch'on	Jinsen	Kyonggi-do	171,165	22.6	14,593	12.5
Kaesong	Kaijō	Kyonggi-do	72,062	9.3	1,860	2.7
Taejon	Taiden	Ch'ungch'ong-namdo	45,541	4.6	9,472	21.7
Chonju	Zenshu	Cholla-pukto	47,230	.6	5,933	13.3
Kunsan	Gunzan	Cholla-pukto	40,553	—1.6	9,540	22.3
Kwangju	Kōshu	Cholla-namdo	64,520	4.0	7,878	13.0
Mokp'o	Moppo	Cholla-namdo	64,256	1.0	8,587	12.5
Taegu	Taikyu	Kyongsang-pukto	178,923	20.3	20,735	12.2
Pusan	Fusan	Kyongsang-namdo	249,734	5.7	51,802	23.3
Masan	Masan	Kyongsang-namdo	36,429	4.0	5,689	16.3
Chinju	Shinshu	Kyongsang-namdo	43,291	7.6	2,732	5.8
Haeju	Kaishu	Hwanghae-do	62,651	9.7	6,080	10.8
P'yongyang	Heijo	P'yongan-namdo	285,960	18.0	25,652	10.3
Chinnamp'o	Chinnampo	P'yongan-namdo	68,656	13.3	6,523	10.2
Sinuiju	Shingishu	P'yongan-pukto	61,143	6.6	8,861	16.0
Wonsan	Genzan	Hamgyong-namdo	79,320	8.0	10,205	14.4
Hamhung	Kanko	Hamgyong-namdo	75,320	4.3	9,615	14.5
Ch'ongjin	Seishin	Hamgyong-pukto	197,918	65.0	15,733	17.0
Najin	Rashin	Hamgyong-pukto	38,319	19.3	5,769	21.6
Total			2,928,555	14.2**	365,282	15.1

* There are no municipalities (*fu*) in Ch'ungch'ong-pukto and Kangwon-do. Songjin was not a *fu* until 1941 and therefore does not appear in this table.
** This increase is in part explained by an extension of the area of certain municipalities.



FIGURE X - 1. *Korea: Areas of Population Concentration.*

Nearly all the larger cities of Korea, however, have grown rapidly in recent years. The total population of the 21 municipalities *(fu)** was 2,110,775 in 1937, and in 1940 had increased by 817,780 to a total of 2,928,555. (TABLE X-2) At the same rate of increase they may be expected to reach 3,638,000 in 1945. This would mean a movement of more than a million and a half from the country to the city during the 7-year period.

*In this chapter Japanese terms for administrative offices and units are used rather than Korean, as the system they describe is Japanese and in general nature resembles that of Japan.

C. Distribution by age and sex.

TABLE X-3 indicates the population distribution by age and sex for 1935. The present distribution no doubt would show a much lower proportion of young males as a result of the increasing draft for labor in the Japanese armed forces and in Japan.

TABLE X-3

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX, 1935 CENSUS

AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	%
1 – 14	4,752,634	4,552,947	9,305,581	43.6
15 – 19	1,105,988	1,039,385	2,145,373	10.1
20 – 24	992,569	951,376	1,843,945	9.2
25 – 29	820,962	807,479	1,628,441	7.7
30 – 39	1,312,035	1,233,364	2,545,399	12.0
40 – 49	1,026,480	873,216	1,899,696	9.0
50 – 59	655,625	470,879	1,126,504	5.3
60 and above	424,221	223,145	647,366	3.1
Total	11,990,514	10,151,791	21,242,305	100

D. National minorities.

(1) Japanese.

The number of Japanese in Korea was officially estimated in 1941 at 717,011. These are preponderantly city dwellers, being engaged chiefly in business or governmental administration. Of the 650,104 resident in Korea in 1939, 365,282 were to be found in the 20 municipalities then existent, 138,023 being found in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul) alone. (TABLE X-2 and FIGURE X-12) In 1937, 73% of the Japanese population in Korea were in 54 cities. The distribution of Japanese by province in 1941 is shown in TABLE X-1 and in cities of over 10,000 population in 1938 is shown in FIGURE X-12.

(2) Other nationals.

The number of foreign nationals other than Japanese in Korea was officially estimated in 1941 at 73,823. No analysis of this figure is available. Of the total number of 52,233 foreigners other than Japanese in Korea in 1939, 51,014 were Chinese (including natives of Manchuria), and 1,219 were of European race, including 546 Americans. Except for prisoners of war, 25 priests of St. Colomban's Mission Society of Ireland, and a few internees, very few occidental residents now remain.

E. Koreans abroad.

Political and economic conditions over the last several decades have led to the creation of important emigrant colonies in foreign countries. Estimates for 1944 placed some 1,450,000 Koreans in Japan proper, 1,475,000 in Manchuria, 100,000 in Occupied China. It is believed that there are 10,000 in Unoccupied China, over 200,000 in U.S.S.R., and 8,700 in the United States.

102. *Physical, Social, and Cultural Characteristics*

A. Koreans.

(1) Racial origins and physical type.

The racial origin of the Korean people is unknown, but they appear to be related racially to the ancient peoples of Manchuria and Siberia, and are thus remotely akin to the Japanese.

The Koreans resemble the Chinese and Japanese in skin, hair, and eye coloring, as well as in eye structure. The average male height is about 5 feet 4 inches, taller than the average Japanese, but shorter than the average northern Chinese. The Koreans are as a group more easily distinguishable from the Japanese than from the Chinese, having generally slighter torsos and longer legs than the former.

(2) Social structure.

(a) Family and clan. Although urbanization and modern life have somewhat modified the traditional structure, social organization in Korean agricultural regions is still based largely on kinship, with the family as the most important single unit. The Korean family is essentially patriarchal, several generations often living together under the same roof or in adjoining houses and contributing their earnings to the common pool. While the family system is based upon the supremacy of the male, the wife in practice plays an important role in the family council, and as a result of Western and Christian influences the younger Korean women often assume a position of leadership in the community. Despite the fact that important decisions are made by the family rather than the individual, the members of the family are apt to display individual initiative in their personal concerns.

Next in importance to the family in the strength of its ties is the clan, composed of a number of related families which may constitute a single village or may reside in several adjacent villages. Under the leadership of the clan elder, the internal life of the clan is regulated, disputes are settled, and such land as is owned in common is farmed by the members of the group.

A concommitant of family organization is ancestor worship, which prevails throughout Korea. Ancestral tablets are set up in the home, family cemeteries receive devoted care, and sacrifices are offered periodically at the sacred ancestral resting places. Japanese disregard for Korean customs regarding ancestor worship has led to serious friction as the Koreans deeply resent any action which might be interpreted as a desecration of cemeteries and ancestral tombs.

In consequence of the strength of the monogamous family system, Koreans have high standards of sexual morality and premarital sexual relations are regarded with strong disfavor. Nevertheless concubinage exists among the higher classes, and

FIGURE X - 2. *Korean gentleman. Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul).* The robe and horsehair hat are typical of the old-style costume of this class.

professional dancers, similar to the *geisha* of Japan, no longer observe the strict moral code which bound them in the past.

As in Japan, prostitution is licensed and controlled by the government. Prostitutes, both Japanese and Korean, are confined to restricted areas, and streetwalking and part-time prostitution are prohibited. Koreans charge the Japanese with deliberate encouragement of prostitution, which is strongly distasteful to the traditional Korean outlook.

(b) Social organizations. On the whole, Koreans are not bound by strong ties to organized social groups other than those which rest upon the family. Numerous trade groups exist which are more economic than social in their interests; and among Christians, both Protestants and Catholics, cohesive non-family social organizations exist.

(c) Social and economic classes. Social status in present-day Korea is determined partly by traditional stratifications and partly by new factors arising from industrialization and the spread of modern education.

Highest in the traditional social hierarchy are the members of the old Korean landed aristocracy, the *yangban* (FIGURE X-2). Until Japanese occupation, the *yangban* class virtually monopolized the country's wealth as well as most positions of public importance. The assumption of control by the Japanese eliminated the political influence of the *yangban,* but to gain their acquiescence in alien control the Japanese have enlisted many of them to serve as figureheads. Thus, just as Prince RI GIN, head of the old Korean ruling family, has become a major-general in the Japanese army so many members of the *yangban* class who have remained in Korea and coöperated with the Japanese have become members of the Central Advisory Council, have increased their economic holdings, and have retained their socially pre-eminent position. In consequence of this identification with the Japanese, the gulf dividing the *yangban* class from the common people of Korea has grown even wider than it was in the past.

Organization of the old Korean civil service on the basis of examinations in the Confucian classics led to the creation of a class of scholars, the *sonsaeng.* Proficiency in the Confucian classics required years of training—hence considerable economic security—and led to a predominance of *yangban* among the scholars. However, infiltration from the lower classes was made possible by a widely generalized veneration for learning which led entire villages to support promising young men until they had passed their examinations. Although Japanese domination of the civil service and the stress on modern rather than classical education has deprived the *sonsaeng* of their pre-eminence, scholars proficient in the Chinese classics still command much respect among Koreans.

In the traditional hierarchy, the aristocrats by birth and training were followed by professional men, small landholders, and small merchants. Next in status were the great mass of tenant farmers and laborers (FIGURE X-3), below them the soldiers, and at the bottom of the social scale, butchers and members of other traditionally despised occupations.

Older social divisions, however, have been somewhat altered in recent times. Probably the most influential group in Korea today is composed of people who have received a modern education, whether in Korea, Japan, Europe, or America. The *yangban* class has been enlarged by the addition of other Koreans who have attained wealth and position through collaboration with the Japanese, and industrialization has created a new urban class to which no well defined position in the old structure can be assigned.

(3) Living conditions.

(a) Housing. Korean houses are generally one-story buildings, shaped like an L or a U with an inside court. The houses of the wealthy differ from those of the poor only in stronger construction, tile roofs, and slightly larger rooms. Walls of the better houses are generally of masonry for the first 4 feet, and of plaster supported by timber for the remainder; walls of the poorer homes are entirely plaster and wood.

Rooms in Korean houses are, by western standards, small and cramped. In the villages an entire family may live in a room with about 128 square feet of floor and a ceiling height of 6 feet. Rooms in city homes may be as large as 200 square feet, but as a rule in the better class homes room size does not exceed 10 by 10 feet. The floors consist of flat stones covered with successive layers of clay, oilpaper, and mats; heat is supplied by flues which run under the floor stones from the kitchen fire. Furniture is scant and simple, and in the poorer houses it is practically nonexistent. Lighting and ventilation are poor, as windows are few and small.

(b) Sanitation in the home. Sanitary conditions are generally poor, particularly in the country. A crude privy usually

FIGURE X - 3. *Common Korean social types.*
Left, middle-class men; center, farm woman with water jug; right, old farmer with carrying frame.



FIGURE X - 4. *Koreans of a more prosperous family.*
The clothes are a type used for special occasions. A charcoal brazier with pressing irons is in left foreground.

stands in one corner of the courtyard; refuse is left lying about in piles or in open ditches; and water is drawn from village wells. Houses, however, are generally swept frequently, and since shoes are removed at the door, mats remain clean over a fairly long period.

(c) Food. Polished rice is the staple food; millet is used as a substitute by those who cannot afford rice. Wheat and barley, and potatoes in the mountainous regions, are consumed to a lesser degree. Dried fish is a common dish, but there is very little use of meat. Vegetables, including cabbage, turnips, and are generally consumed in pickled form. Fruit, formerly very scarce, is gradually becoming part of the Korean diet. Tea is the common beverage.

FIGURE X - 5. *A street scene in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul).*
Western and Oriental styles of clothing mingle in cities.

(d) Clothing. Traditional native dress is similar for men and women and is made of white cotton; padded cotton is worn in winter. (FIGURE X-4) People of both sexes wear baggy trousers tied at the ankle; in addition, men wear a colored vest, and women a short jacket. Outside the home, women always wear long skirts over their trousers and men wear long coats. Some older men still wear high-crowned horse-hair hats, and women generally wear turban-like headdresses which vary considerably in different provinces. Peasants wear straw sandals with a rigid back while wealthier Koreans wear leather shoes.

Although the majority of country dwellers continue to wear native dress, the younger generation and the city dwellers have tended to adopt western clothing, in many cases combining items of western dress with garments of the old style. (FIGURE X-5)

(4) Cultural characteristics.

(a) Language.

1. KOREAN. A single tongue—the Korean language—is spoken throughout Korea. The pronunciations found in northern Korea differ somewhat from those of the southern provinces, but not sufficiently to prevent ready mutual understanding between speakers of the variant dialects. The speech of Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul), resembling that of southern Korea, is considered standard. The Korean language is quite distinct from the languages spoken in the neighboring countries. Its closest relationship is with the Mongolian language group, which it resembles both in grammatical structure and in many word forms. Many Chinese words and compounds, borrowed at an early period and slightly modified in pronunciation over the centuries, have assumed an important place in the Korean vocabulary.

A phonetic script called *onmun,* developed in the 15th century, is most commonly known, being understood by some 45 to 50% of Korean adults. Among Korean Christian adults, *onmun* literacy is said to reach 90%. Chinese characters—used exclusively in Korean before the development of *onmun* and favored for official and scholarly use until recent years—continue to play an important part. They are commonly used for the writing of proper names, both personal and geographic, and they are generally used in publications in conjunction with *onmun* to constitute a written style known as mixed script.

2. OTHER LANGUAGES. Since the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, the Japanese have made every effort to supplant the Korean language with Japanese. The latter language is a compulsory study in the schools, and the only vehicle for higher instruction. It has been used for all official purposes, and in 1939 the transaction of official or commercial business in Korean was forbidden. Little published matter has appeared recently in Korean. Despite these measures, only about 15% of Koreans are able to understand Japanese, and only about 8% can speak it easily; extensive use of interpreters is necessary. The knowledge of Japanese by Koreans in the several provinces is indicated in FIGURE X-6. Because of the intensive school training, probably 40% of Koreans between the ages of 15 and 30 understand Japanese. Of the total number understanding Japanese, perhaps ⅔ are men.

No figures are available on the knowledge of English in Korea. The teaching of English in missionary schools in Korea and to a lesser extent in high schools, and the study of English by Korean university students in Japan and other foreign countries has given it widespread currency among Korean intellectuals.

(b) Temperament and social customs. Koreans are inclined in general to be quick-tempered and emotional. They place strong emphasis on questions of "face." Such tendencies, together with an inclination toward jealousy and the formation of cliques, have hampered the development of native leadership; Koreans have nevertheless shown themselves, both in political and religious movements, to be capable of self-discipline, devotion, and fortitude. The ordinary Korean, although more individualistic and less amenable to regimentation than the average Japanese, is generally submissive in the face of authority. Notwithstanding his reputation for laziness, the Korean is capable of great exertion for a cause, while the Korean peasants work long hours for small returns in the intensely hot Korean summer and the equally severe winter.

Certain differences exist between northern and southern Koreans. The latter are said in many cases to have less initiative and to be more phlegmatic and docile than the more ambitious and daring northerners. Northern Korea is traditionally the source of insurrection and revolt. Such differences have been reduced by industrialization and the mingling of northern and southern Koreans in the cities.

In rural Korea, the home of ⅘ of the population, the customs of the past are still strong notwithstanding a veneer of Japanese culture; many Koreans make a conscious effort to preserve the old culture despite Japanese attempts to suppress it. In the cities, especially in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul), Western influence has been fairly strong.

The most persistent Korean social customs are those connected with marriage and death. Both marriage and funeral ceremonies are elaborate and involve considerable expense. Even the poorest peasant regards lavish expenditure as obligatory on such occasions and may mortgage his future earnings for this purpose.

(5) Religion.

(a) Religious affiliations and attitudes. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity are the major faiths in Korea. In addition, shamanism, and a native cult, Chondokyo, are practiced. Adherents of all these faiths are scattered throughout the country, and no one of them is identified with any particular area.

While only 1½ million Koreans are actually registered as adherents of any particular faith, the figures in themselves are misleading, as many Koreans who are not registered are strongly influenced in thought and habit by Confucianism or Buddhism, and in the case of the common people, by shamanism. The Korean who has no formal religious affiliation is, on the whole, eclectic in his faith drawing upon such elements in each religion as appeal to him, particularly those elements which he feels will result in the intercession of supernatural influences on his behalf.

Probably because of their eclecticism, Koreans are tolerant in religion and have few strong tabus, demanding only a reasonable respect for their customs and beliefs, particularly those connected with ancestor-worship. The presence of a well-behaved visitor, however, causes no offense in a Korean temple even while religious rites are in progress.

(b) Japanese religious policy. Japanese religious policy in Korea has had 2 aspects: the propagation of Shinto, both state and sectarian, and the weakening of Christianity. State Shinto, regarded by the Japanese not as a religious faith, but as an expression of patriotism and loyalty, has been to some extent forced on Korea by the requirement that all Koreans in public positions as well as all teachers and students worship at Shinto shrines on Japanese holidays. Nonofficial Shinto sects have had little success in Korea, and their adherents are confined principally to Japanese residents.

Unable to impose Shinto on the Koreans, the Japanese have attempted to weaken Christianity by placing obstacles in the



FIGURE X - 6. *Percentage of Koreans who understand and speak Japanese.*

path of Christian missionaries and organizations, by discriminating against converts, and by supporting the revival of ancient creeds and beliefs through rebuilding and subsidizing shrines and temples, particularly those associated with Buddhism.

(c) Buddhism. Buddhism, introduced into Korea from China in 372 A.D., played a major role in Korean social and cultural development. It is no longer of active influence, however, and in 1939 had only 194,800 announced adherents. The great Buddhist mountain temples are now almost deserted and are attended only by a few begging priests. (FIGURE X-7) Japanese Buddhism, of which there are 9 sects in Korea, has been little more successful than Shinto among Koreans; most of its adherents are among Japanese residents.



FIGURE X - 7. *A Buddist Temple in the Diamond Mountains.* Chōsen Christian College teachers and students.

(d) Confucianism. Confucianism, introduced into Korea in 550 B.C. has had a much more lasting influence on Korean thought and ethical codes than Buddhism, although its actual formal adherents were said in 1930 to number no more than 500,000. Widespread ancestor-worship reflects the strength of the Confucian heritage as does the high esteem in which learning is held. Even today when knowledge of the Confucian classics has lost all practical value, one or two Confucian scholars are to be found in most villages.

(e) Christianity. Christianity, though small in number of adherents, is Korea's most active religion. It first became known indirectly, through China. The first Catholic missionary went to Korea in 1833, the first Protestant in 1885. Since that time missionary activity in Korea has been predominantly American, but Canadian, Australian, English, German, French, and Irish groups have also been important. The Christian churches of present-day Korea are supported, administered, and controlled entirely by Koreans; they had in 1941 about 500,000 members. Church organization has been one of the very few fields in which Koreans have had the opportunity to assume positions of administrative importance, and their work in such positions has shown them to be capable of successfully assuming responsibility when the opportunity presents itself. Christian churches have been centers of non-Japanese education in Korea, striving at the same time to preserve Korean culture and language and to educate Koreans in modern ideas and techniques. They have thus created a small class of Koreans who are at once devoted to their country, receptive to Western influence, and potential leaders of Korean reconstruction.

(f) Shamanism. Shamanism, a cult of Ural-Altaic origin, is a mixture of demonology, magic, and astrology based on superstition. It has a strong hold on the population, and most Korean peasants practice it on occasion, particularly in time of illness or misfortune when offerings are made at its roadside shrines, and witch-doctors *(mudang)*—generally old women—and astrologers are consulted.

(g) Chondokyo. Chondokyo is an indigenous religion which originated partly as a political reform movement and partly as a religious doctrine in the early 1860's. As a religion, Chondokyo has borrowed extensively from other faiths. Monotheistic, yet with strong pantheist leanings, it places stress on the unity of man with the universe, on human liberty, and on ethical improvement. Chondokyo denies the existence of sin and of a life after death, and strives to realize heaven on earth. Its adherents may practice plural marriage. Church organization is based on an elective system. Elected priests serve fixed terms and coördination is achieved to some degree by the existence of central committees, the members of which are also elected, in each province.

Politically, Chondokyo has been nationalistic, and its members have participated actively in independence movements. In consequence it has been banned by the Japanese and has been forced to operate underground. The size of its membership is, therefore, in considerable doubt. Adherents of Chondokyo have claimed a membership of 3,000,000 to 4,000,000; a Japanese statement estimates its membership as about 2,000,000; while an American authority believes its actual followers to be no more than 300,000.

(6) Education and dissemination of information.

(a) Japanese educational policy. While Japanese policy in Korea has been directed toward supplanting the indigenous culture by that of Japan, it has nevertheless contributed to educational development by replacing an outworn and limited system based on Confucianism with fairly well-organized modern schools which, at the primary level at least, have reached an increasingly larger percentage of the Korean population. In 1930, for example, 1 of every 7 Korean children of school age was attending primary school, while by 1942 the figure had been raised to 2 of every 5, 75% of them boys. In the provisions made for educational facilities, particularly on the higher level, there has been considerable discrimination in favor of the Japanese residents, both teachers and pupils. For the Japanese residents, 3% of the population in 1939, there were 562 primary and secondary schools with 114,081 pupils and 3,405 teachers, while in the same year almost 1,500,000 Korean students attended 4,580 schools. In addition, Korean teachers are discriminated against in favor of Japanese teachers: Koreans do not teach in Japanese schools, but Japanese can and do teach in Korean schools (TABLE X-4); Japanese teachers in primary schools receive about 100 *yen* a month, while Koreans are paid only 56 *yen*.

TABLE X - 4

NATIONALITY OF TEACHERS IN KOREAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1938

TYPE OF SCHOOL	KOREAN	JAPANESE
Public primary schools for Koreans	8,520	5,745
Public high schools for Koreans	112	446
Government colleges	70	184
Universities	145	474

On the higher levels, however, the inadequacies of Japanese educational facilities have been somewhat mitigated by the existence of private institutions, chiefly denominational Christian schools (TABLE X-5).

In addition Koreans have studied abroad, especially in Japan but sometimes in Europe or America. Law and medicine, particularly, have attracted large numbers of Korean students as the practice of these professions requires neither a large capital investment nor the necessity of seeking employment in government- or Japanese-dominated industry. Japanese-educated Koreans are notoriously anti-Japanese, their original dislike usually having been intensified by discrimination encountered in Japan.

The Japanese school system in Korea has always emphasized uniformity and rigid centralized control under the Education Bureau *(Gakumu-kyoku)* and its curriculum, the inculcation of Japanese ideology, and the study of Japanese language.

TABLE X - 5

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN KOREA, 1939

	Number of schools public and private	Teachers	Japanese and foreign pupils	Korean pupils	Percent of Koreans in private schools in 1936
Elementary schools	10,384	28,056	92,892	1,370,651	18
Middle Schools	152	2,402	23,675	39,843	28
Technical schools (total)	83	1,129	6,380	19,118	22
Agriculture	38	428	905	8,500	
Commercial	27	464	4,233	7,847	
Engineering	3	35	412	302	
Fishery	4	33	55	364	
Vocational	11	169	775	2,105	
Advanced technical schools	143	411	1,074	7,017	9
Higher education	29	1,335	5,038	6,519	29
University	1	624	350	6,519	—
University Prep.	1	34	338	204	—
Colleges	18	436	1,875	3,031	57
Normal schools	9	241	2,475	3,078	—

After 1936 the Japanization and militarization of Korean education was further intensified. Military training became obligatory in all schools above the primary level; the teaching and use of Korean was prohibited in all schools, public or private, except for the beginning primary grades; patriotic ceremonies came to occupy an increasing amount of the students' time; and all Korean students were required to adopt Japanese family names. After 1939 new regulations not only succeeded in forcing all foreigners out of their positions in Korean schools but foreign-educated Koreans also were systematically eliminated. With the growth in intensity of Japanese efforts to use the schools for purposes of indoctrination has come increasing government interference in day-to-day school affairs, not only on the part of the Education Bureau, but also by civil and military police and local authorities, all anxious to display their zeal.

(b) Private schools. Private schools, largely conducted by Christian groups, have been a valuable supplement to state education. These schools, maintained in the past both by American missions and local groups, tended to be conducted in Korean in the lower grades and were important in spreading knowledge of Western tongues (particularly English), and Western institutions among their pupils (FIGURE X-8).

FIGURE X - 8. *Students and teachers of a private primary school in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul).*

By 1939, however, Americans had been eliminated from the administration of the mission schools and the schools themselves were forced to conform more and more to the patterns established for the public schools.

(c) Official dissemination of information. The dissemination of information in Korea through press and radio is closely controlled by the Japanese. In 1940, 2 of the few important Korean newspapers to continue publication despite the obstacles placed in their path, were suppressed. Since that time most newspapers have been Japanese-edited, and of these few contain even a Korean language section. Outside of the cities these papers have few readers both because they are written in a language which only about 15% of the people can read and because they are recognized as Japanese propaganda organs.

All other printed matter is rigorously censored prior to publication, and similar censorship is exercised over public meetings which must have the approval of the police and must be held in the presence of police representatives.

Broadcasting is similarly Japanese-controlled, and most of the Japanese language programs broadcast by Korea's 7 stations originate in Japan. Korean language programs are also presented but equally reflect the official propaganda line. All receivers, generally 3- to 5-tube sets of Japanese manufacture, must be registered and a license, for which a fee is charged, obtained for their use. At the end of March 1940 there were 167,480 licensed sets in Korea, 88,707 in the possession of Japanese and 77,996 in the hands of Koreans.

Shortwave receiving sets are forbidden, as are amateur broadcastings units; and it is illegal to listen to any broadcast not sponsored by the Japanese. Despite the heavy penalties involved, however, some Koreans do listen to Russian and Chinese programs, while as late as 1942 sets capable of receiving broadcasts originating in San Francisco were known to be in Korean hands.

(d) Unofficial dissemination of information. Japanese efforts to control completely the dissemination of information in Korea have been hampered by the ease with which Koreans have devised unofficial means of communication. Most important are the country markets held weekly throughout Korea, to which traveling merchants carry news they have gathered on their trips. So extensive is the scope of these merchants' activities that taken together they form a communication network that covers the country. Also important in the dissemination of information are the Christian groups whose workers travel from church to church; adherents of the Chondokyo sect perform similar functions, although they are not so highly organized as are the Christian churches.

B. Japanese.

(1) Social structure.

(a) Occupational groups and social classes. The Japanese in Korea, more than 700,000 in number, are chiefly government officials, members of the police, businessmen, landowners, technicians, small merchants, skilled laborers, and a very few farmers. In addition to these are the army personnel stationed there. Social stratification is reflected in the fact that the predominantly city-dwelling Japanese (FIGURE X-12) have tended within their own residential sections to segregate themselves on the basis of income levels. In all occupational groups Japanese standards of living are higher than those of Koreans of corresponding classes.

(b) Relationships with Koreans. The Japanese attitude toward the Koreans is conditioned by their position as a dominant minority. There is no social intercourse between the two groups, the Japanese having separate schools, churches, temples, and clubs and living in separate sections of the cities. Intermarriage is rare, and when it does occur is generally between a Japanese man and a Korean woman.

(2) Cultural characteristics.

Japanese residents of Korea have retained intact, the cultural pattern of their homeland showing little interest in anything of Korean origin. Almost no Japanese have learned the Korean language.

C. Chinese.

(1) Social structure.

(a) Occupational groups. There are approximately 70,000 Chinese in Korea, chiefly small merchants, laborers, and farmers. About 76% of them are males. Most of them have come to Korea in the expectation of bettering their economic status and plan an eventual return to China, retaining their affiliation with their native country through membership in Chinese guilds.

(b) Relationships with the Koreans. Like the Japanese, the Chinese have their own neighborhoods, clubs, schools, and temples, and engage in practically no social intercourse with the Koreans. The fact that the Chinese is generally more successful than his Korean competitor is a source of friction between the two groups, aggravated by the Korean suspicion that Chinese residents are merely exploiting the country and returning nothing to it.

(2) Cultural characteristics.

The Chinese do not regard themselves as permanent residents, and have retained their cultural identity. Few of them ever learn more than a smattering of Korean.

103. *Labor Supply*

A. Numbers and skills.

(1) Occupational distribution.

Reliable figures are lacking on the total number of Koreans gainfully employed or available for employment. Statistics on major occupational groups of the Korean population for 1939 (22,098,310) show about 75% dependent on agriculture, about 7% on commerce, and the remainder distributed among fishing, mining, transportation, public service, professional work, and industry (TABLE X-6). According to the same statistics, the Japanese population of 650,104 was 38% reliant for support on public service and other professions, 22% on commerce, and 17% on industry, the remaining 13% being divided among agriculture, fishing, mining, transportation, and other occupations. Because of the larger family participation in farm work, these figures probably under-emphasize considerably the proportion of Korean labor engaged in agriculture. The figures include both rank-and-file workers and administrators thus overemphasizing the numbers engaged in industries, mining and transportation.

(2) Numbers of wage earners.

There were in 1938 an estimated 1,173,285 wage earners in Korea. Of this number 231,000 were classified in industry (including 182,000 workers in factories with 5 or more employees), 224,000 employed in mines, and 193,000 in construction work. Since that time, the increasing trend toward industrialization in Korea has caused a rapid rise in the number of miners, construction workers, and factory workers. The numbers employed in factories in 1939 are shown in TABLE X-7; factory expansion has continued since that time, and it is believed that this trend, combined with the recruitment of workers for Japanese factories, has not only created a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labor, but more than absorbed the normal slack of seasonal farm workers available as unskilled labor.

TABLE X - 6

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION BY MAJOR ACTIVITY, 1939

Occupation	Koreans		Japanese		Chinese and others		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Agriculture	16,486,959	74.9	33,257	5.1	1,188	2.7	16,521,404	72.2
Fishery	337,310	1.5	9,540	1.5	70	.1	346,920	1.4
Mining	322,988	1.4	18,604	2.8	2,169	5.0	343,761	1.4
Industry	611,958	2.8	111,808	17.2	8,650	20.2	732,416	3.1
Commerce	1,501,548	6.7	144,647	22.3	19,027	43.9	1,665,222	7.2
Transportation	225,264	1.0	37,705	5.8	2,586	6.1	265,555	2.2
Public service and professions	666,782	3.0	246,967	38.0	2,425	5.6	916,174	3.9
Various other occupations	1,559,101	7.0	24,932	3.8	6,922	16.0	1,590,955	6.9
Unemployed	386,400	1.7	22,644	3.5	196	.4	409,240	1.7
Total	22,098,310	100	650,104	100	43,233	100	22,801,647	100

TABLE X - 7

INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT IN KOREA, 1939

Industry group	Number of factory workers			Total number of employees*		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Spinning and weaving	10,370	37,014	47,384	14,026	38,055	52,081
Metal work	13,544	128	13,672	17,428	447	17,875
Machinery	24,064	681	24,745	28,628	951	29,579
Ceramic products	9,906	1,404	11,310	13,457	1,705	15,162
Chemical products	40,189	12,104	52,293	54,333	17,340	71,673
Lumber and woodworking	7,176	309	7,485	11,964	437	12,401
Printing and binding	6,618	287	6,905	8,062	341	8,403
Foodstuffs	24,773	10,774	35,547	36,796	11,814	48,610
Gas and electricity	939	—	939	1,321	15	1,336
Miscellaneous	6,826	5,353	12,179	7,874	5,445	13,319
Totals	144,405	68,055	212,459	193,889	76,550	270,439

* The difference between the number of factory workers and the total number of employees indicates the number of managerial, office, and similar employees.

(3) Quality and distribution of labor supply.

The quantity of skilled labor available in Korea is small, as the occupational statistics suggest, and a very considerable proportion of it is supplied by Japanese workers. Two factors have been largely responsible for these conditions: the Japanese policy which has preferred to retain the more skilled occupations in Japanese hands, and the limited education available to Koreans of the working class, which has rendered them unqualified for technical work. The available supply of skilled industrial or technical labor is largely concentrated in the industrial centers of Kyonggi, South P'yongan, and North and South Hamgyong provinces.

The average efficiency of Korean labor is low not only by Western standards but also in comparison with Chinese or Japanese standards. Beyond the lack of education, this may be attributed to an inadequate diet, a high incidence of such diseases as hookworm, chronic dysentery, and malaria, and lack of medical attention. Under favorable circumstances the Korean workman has shown himself well capable of competing with others, and he is quite competent at handling his accustomed crude tools. He prefers to carry loads on his back rather than to push a wheelbarrow.

A considerable share of labor is supplied by women, but this is limited to certain occupations and kinds of work. Elsewhere, the work of the country woman is limited traditionally to the confines of the family farm. In Korea, however, in addition to the work of the home she does a large share of the field work. She also plays an important role in the home industries such as weaving. More recently, women have begun to play an important part in certain types of factory work. In 1938, 81% of the work in the textile industries was done by women (TABLE X-8). In recent years there has also been a trend toward greater employment of women in heavy work. It is stated that women composed nearly 10% of mining labor as early as 1938. It still remains unusual, however, for women to be employed in most kinds of ordinary unskilled labor.

Children also are employed in most industries, notably in textiles, where in 1938 they supplied 22% of the total labor (TABLE X-8).

TABLE X - 8

COMPOSITION OF KOREAN INDUSTRIAL WORKERS BY AGE AND SEX, 1938

(percent)

Industry	15 years and under	16 to 50 years	51 years and over	Male	Female
Textiles	22	78	0	19	81
Metals	5	94	1	95	5
Machinery	9	91	0	96	4
Ceramics	9	90	1	74	26
Chemicals	4	95	1	74	26
Lumber and woodworking	5	94	1	99	1
Printing	6	93	1	97	3
Foodstuffs	4	94	2	70	30
Gas and electricity	0	99	1	97	3
Other industries	16	82	2	69	31
Average	9	90	1	70	30

B. Working conditions.

(1) Wages.

Information is lacking on present wage rates for labor in Korea. In 1938, the latest year for which comprehensive figures are available, the average daily wage for adult male Korean industrial workers was somewhat over 1 *yen* ($0.50). This included a range from 1.79 *yen* for the more highly skilled metal workers to 0.34 *yen* in flour milling. In general the Japanese worker in any trade received about double the above indicated pay of a Korean worker; this is in part because the Japanese occupied the more skilled positions. Women, Korean or Japanese, received about half the pay of men of their respective nationalities, and children under 16 somewhat less than women. The pay of the farm laborer is also less than that of the factory worker. All of these rates are known to have

risen markedly under recent inflationary conditions, although this does not represent a rise in real wages.

(2) Hours.

Except for farm work, in which the hours are of course irregular, the work day in 1938 in most Korean industries and occupations averaged 10 to 11 hours, and in certain industries 12 hours. This followed generally the practice in Japan. Hours for women and children were similar to those for men. There was already some tendency to reduce working hours in certain industries, but since the outbreak of the war the tendency has been rather toward a lengthening of the work day. In certain industries short rest periods have been allowed. Sundays have in Korea as in Japan no significance as a rest day, but in certain cases 2 days a month have been allowed for rest.

(3) Factory and home conditions.

There are few official restrictions on the treatment of labor in Korea. Safety measures are often neglected in factories, and accident rates are high. In the larger industrial cities, the great influx of workers in recent years has resulted also in very inadequate and extremely unsanitary housing for much of the industrial labor; in P'yongyang it was reported in 1941 that many even resorted to making caves in the hillside, or temporary shelters of straw. Although the living standard of the city worker has been appreciably higher than that of the rural worker, this has usually been achieved only by supplementing the family income by the labor of wife and children, in the factory or in the home. Even then the income has barely covered the necessities of life. The average daily wage rose by some 40% between 1933 and 1940, but the rise of prices in the same period was such as to cause a net fall of nearly 28% in real wages. It is believed that this tendency has become still more pronounced during the war.

(4) Labor organization.

Since 1937, all independent labor unions have been rigorously eliminated by the police. All news of labor disputes is suppressed. Before that time, however, small scale strikes had occurred sporadically, connected with demands including wage increases, improvement in working conditions, and dismissal of supervisors. A strike of 2,000 workers at Wonsan in 1929, lasting 3 months, largely immobilized traffic at that port. This movement evoked much sympathy among Korean workers throughout the country, but was ended by the suppression of the unions involved. In 1935, 1,300 metallurgic workers went on strike in the ore smelting plant in Chinnamp'o for increase in wages and equalization of wages for Korean and Japanese workers. In the same year, 800 men went on strike in a printing establishment in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul) for demands including wage increases, better treatment, and discontinuance of searches on leaving the establishment. More recently, the only labor movement permitted has been the Patriotic Labor Front *(Kinro Hokoku Undo)*, founded under the auspices of the semi-official Spiritual Mobilization Movement and under immediate supervision of the army and the police. This organization includes both agricultural and industrial workers.

C. Recruitment of labor.

(1) Japanese methods.

The usual practice in hiring Korean labor before the outbreak of the war with China was through the use of Japanese or Korean labor brokers. Payment of wages was done through the brokers.

Control of labor was centralized under the Japanese National Mobilization Law of 1938 and succeeding measures. Under these the authority of the Japanese Welfare and Munitions Ministries was exercised in Korea chiefly through the police offices, where records are kept.

Under the ordinance concerning the Declaration of Vocational Abilities of the People, skilled workers were compelled to register their abilities and experience. On 29 January 1939, men 15 to 50 years of age were required to register with the public employment exchanges if they had worked in designated vocations for more than 3 consecutive months or were graduates of designated universities, colleges, or technical schools. Men in military service were exempted.

The registrants in the occupational census became subject to labor conscription under the ordinance which came into force on 15 July 1939 calling civilians to national service.

Evidence indicates that the powers of labor conscription were not widely exercised until 1942, at which time it is reported that in some places townspeople were required to furnish labor, chiefly on roads but also on other government projects. In the registration held in February 1943, males 12 to 60 years of age, both skilled and unskilled, were required to register. While the 1939 ordinance applied to skilled workers only, that of 1943 applied to seamen also.

Student labor service was first formally adopted on 9 July 1938 throughout Japan and Korea. Through progressive changes, the period of time which students have to serve has been increased from 5 days to as much as a year. Simultaneously with the extension of the period of labor service, the type of work in which students participate has been broadened. Specialists serve in their respective fields. During summer vacations and on holidays, students help out on farms and in factories. The use of school buildings as factories and workshops is another means of utilizing student labor, as the students are enabled to work while attending school. In March 1944 the reverse procedure was introduced: classes were held in factories for students at work there. The Saturday half-holiday and Sunday holiday were cancelled.

(2) Methods available to an invading force.

It is probable that Korean laborers will show willingness to work for invading forces, particularly forces of nations toward whom they are more favorably disposed. In order to avoid discontent that may arise from profiteering on the part of labor brokers, however, certain precautions may be useful. Village headmen or in certain communities Christian pastors may serve as intermediaries in selecting reliable brokers. Where need for laborers is large, the terms of employment could be widely posted and recruits grouped by village. Individual groups often elect a representative to negotiate with the employer. This representative may be one of their number or another trusted person. To avoid misunderstanding, the representative may receive the pay in the presence of the group, the amount being publicly stated.

The availability of an administrator familiar with Korean customs will help to obviate difficulties in handling workmen. Disturbances or slowdowns may easily result from inappropriate wage distribution or from misunderstanding over terms of employment. Among methods which have helped to increase work efficiency are the use of food subsidies, and the assignment of separate parts of a job by contract to separate gangs on a piecework basis. Korean workmen are in general willing to expend greater effort for extra compensation.

104. *Government Organization*

A. General description.

(1) Status in the Japanese empire.

Until November 1942 Korea was a Japanese colony administratively under the supervision of the Overseas Ministry. In that year Korea became an integral part of Japan and, like the Japanese prefectures, was placed under the administrative supervision of the Home Ministry. Under both ministries, however, the influence of the Army largely determined administrative policy. All power over internal politics and administration stems from Japan and is exercised in Korea only within such limits as are imposed by Japanese interests. All officials are appointed from above, and each functions under the supervision of the official next above him in rank. The Governor-General is always a high-ranking army or navy officer; military personnel hold office in the civilian organs of Korean government; and extensive control is exercised over the civilian population by the military police.

(2) Structure of the Government-General.

(a) The Governor-General. At the apex of Korea's pyramid of power stands the Governor-General *(Sotoku)*, whose appointment is recommended by the Japanese Premier on the advice of the Home Minister (FIGURE X-9). Under the direction of the Japanese government, the Governor-General exercises wide powers over administration, justice, and public safety. With the approval of the Premier, he appoints the most important local executives, the provincial governors, and the municipal mayors, as well as all officers of the Government-General except the Civil Administrator. His executive authority includes the right to call upon the commander of the armed forces in Korea for troops when he deems an emergency to exist. Although he is governed in general by the laws of Japan, he may issue decrees on a wide variety of local Korean matters; he exercises extraordinary control in time of emergencies; and he may impose fines or prison sentences outside the provisions of the regular laws.

(b) The Civil Administrator. The Civil Administrator *(Seimu Sokan)*, who is appointed by the Premier upon the advice of the Home Minister, serves as the Governor's chief administrative assistant and is charged with the supervision of the government bureaus, both central and local. He makes



FIGURE X-9. *The Government of Korea.*

TABLE X - 9

KOREAN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL, 1936

RANK	GOVERNMENT-GENERAL						PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT		MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT		TOTAL**	
	CENTRAL OFFICES		CENTRAL ADVISORY COUNCIL***		LOCAL AND AFFILIATED OFFICES							
	Japanese	*Korean*	*Japanese*	*Korean*	*Japanese*	*Korean*	*Japanese*	*Korean*	*Japanese*	*Korean*	*Japanese*	*Korean*
Chokunin*	15	0	0	29	73	6	2	0	0	0	90	35
Sonin*	149	5	1	40	1,039	288	498	17	57	0	1,744	350
Hannin	670	47	4	2	22,066	11,698	2,902	903	1,752	764	27,394	13,414
Riin									701	278	701	278
Koin	814	269	0	20	12,672	8,668	730	1,776	796	714	15,012	11,447
Total	1,648	321	5	91	35,850	20,660	4,132	2,696	3,306	1,756	44,941	25,524

* Including those not officially of this rank but treated as of similar status.

** These totals are exclusive of 993 Japanese and 592 Korean part-time employees. They also exclude 51,036 town, township, and ward officials for which group no distinction was made between Japanese and Koreans in the figures available.

*** Including both the regular councillors and other officials attached to the council.

regular inspection trips to all the provinces and performs the functions of the Governor-General if the latter is out of the country or incapacitated. The Civil Administrator need not necessarily be changed when a new Governor-General is appointed.

The Civil Administrator is assisted in the performance of his functions by a Secretariat which prior to October 1943 included a Personnel Section *(Jinji-ka)*, an Accounts Section *(Kaikei-ka)*, a number of secretaries, and 2 Imperial Commissioners, one representing the Army and one the Navy. The acquisition by the Secretariat of increased supervisory and planning powers after October 1943 probably resulted in the creation of additional sections.

(c) The bureaus. In addition to the Secretariat, there are 7 bureaus: Finance Bureau *(Zaimu-kyoku);* Communications Bureau *(Kotsu-kyoku);* Agriculture and Commerce Bureau *(Nosho-kyoku);* Mining and Industry Bureau *(Koko-kyoku);* Justice Bureau *(Homu-kyoku;)* Education Bureau *(Gakumu-kyoku);* and the Police Bureau *(Keimu-kyoku.)*

These bureaus were the result of a reorganization which took place in October 1943, paralleling a similar reorganization in Japan proper and having as its object increased production of munitions through the elimination of unnecessary government machinery, unification of control over related fields, and decentralization of administrative responsibility. While the functions of the Bureaus of Justice, Education, and Police appear to have been unchanged by this reorganization, substantial changes were made in the jurisdiction of bureaus more closely connected with war production. The Communications Bureau *(Teishin-kyoku)*, which had controlled maritime transport, customs, aviation, and communications, and the Railway Bureau *(Tetsudo-kyoku)* were dissolved and a Communications Bureau *(Kotsu-kyoku)* set up in their place and given the functions of both. The functions formerly exercised by the Industrial Bureau *(Shokusan-kyoku)* and control over coal production were placed under the jurisdiction of the Mining and Industry Bureau *(Koko-kyoku)*. The Agriculture and Forestry Bureau *(Norin-kyoku)* was abolished and in its stead a Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce *(Nosho-kyoku)* was established. The Monopoly Bureau *(Sembai-kyoku)*, hitherto an independent office, was brought under the jurisdiction of the Finance Bureau *(Zaimu-kyoku);* and several of the functions previously performed by the central bureaus or their local offices including public works, forestry, and the collection of revenue, were transferred to the provincial and municipal governments.

The personnel of the bureaus reflects Japanese domination of Korean life. The department of Agriculture and Forestry *(Norin-kyoku)*, for example, in 1941 had as chief a Japanese official of the first grade. Among the other 58 higher officials in the department, there was only one Korean, and he was only of the sixth grade rank. This condition was not due to the lack of Koreans trained in agriculture or forestry; Korean candidates were often rejected because Japanese were wanted. In all the other parts of the government the situation was much the same (TABLE X-9).

(d) Central Advisory Council (Chusu-in). The Central Advisory Council is the only nation-wide body approaching legislative status, but as can be seen from its name, its function is purely advisory. Its 65 councillors are appointed by the Governor-General from the Korean *yangban* or wealthy class for a term of 3 years. The Civil Administrator, a Japanese, acts as the chairman of the Council.

This body can offer advice only upon the request of the Governor-General and then upon a specific subject. The Governor is under no obligation to follow the advice given by the Council, and while its recommendations have sometimes been put into effect, in practice its advice has been asked only on matters of lesser importance. It has therefore, achieved very little in securing political advantages for the Koreans and, in fact, its members have been chosen not because of their qualities of leadership, but because the Japanese wanted to give some semblance of "face" to the old ruling class of Korea. Those who have shown any anti-Japanese sentiments have never been chosen for the Council; the Council members are either elderly persons who helped sell out the old Korean regime to Japan or are new officers of companies which have as their purpose the consolidation of Japanese control over Korean assets.

B. Provincial government.

(1) Organization and control of the provinces (FIGURE X-13).

The entire peninsula is divided into 13 provinces *(dō)*. Three of the 8 provinces of the old Korean kingdom have remained intact while the remaining 5 have each been divided



FIGURE X - 10. *Provincial and local government in Korea.*

into a northern and a southern province. These are subdivided into 218 counties *(gun)* and 2 islands *(tō)* at the end of 1943 containing 114 towns *(yu)* and 2,211 townships *(men)*. (FIGURE X-13) In addition, there exist 21 municipalities *(fu)* which are outside county or island jurisdiction. The provincial government is headed by the governor *(dō-chiji)*, whose term of office depends on the will of the Governor-General.

With the reorganization of October 1943 the provinces gained additional functions and administrative responsibility, but the supervisory and appointive powers of the Government-General are so great as to render independent provincial action impossible. Major supervision over local administration is exercised by the Civil Administrator and the Secretariat, but the other bureaus of the Government-General also exercise authority over the provinces within their fields of jurisdiction, the provincial divisions *(bu)* corresponding roughly in their functions to the central bureaus.

(2) Structure of the provincial government.

(a) Provincial governor (dō-chiji). The provincial governors are appointed by the Governor-General with the approval of the Premier of Japan. Within the limits created by central supervision and the power of the Governor-General to veto their actions, the provinces are in fact ruled by the governors. (FIGURE X-8) The provincial governor administers the affairs of the province through his secretaries, the Division of Internal Affairs *(Naimu-bu)*, and the Police Division *(Keisatsu-bu)*; he has the right to imprison anyone within the province for a period up to 3 months or fine anyone up to 100 *yen* without recourse to the courts. He controls all local bodies and is authorized to issue local ordinances. He appoints the heads of both the incorporated towns *(yu)* and the townships *(men)*, and supervises the administration of counties, towns, and townships. He selects ⅓ of the membership of the provincial council and advises that body as to its actions. Though he cannot order the use of troops without asking approval of the Government-General, he may request the commander of the local Japanese Army detachment to use his troops against the Korean population.

(b) Vice-governors (Sanyokan). The vice-governor is appointed by the Governor-General. The duties of the vice-governor are similar to those of the Civil Administrator of the central government. He supervises the work of the several divisions and that of the provincial secretariat. He may take the place of the governor if necessary. When the governor is a Japanese, as is usually the case, the vice-governor is often a Korean, and his position is of little importance. But when, as is sometimes the case, the Governor is a Korean, the vice-governor will be a Japanese and will assume the real authority of provincial government.

(c) The divisions (bu). Routine administrative functions are performed by the divisions of which each province has 5. They include the Internal Affairs Division *(Naimu-bu)* having jurisdiction over local government, education, social welfare, and public works, the Finance Division *(Zaimu-bu)*, the Police Division *(Keisatsu-bu)*, and 2 divisions set up in October 1943, the Mining and Industry Division *(Koko-bu)* and the Agriculture and Commerce Division *(Nosho-bu)* whose functions are presumed to parallel those of the central bureaus. At the same time jurisdiction over forestry and employment agencies was transferred to the local units, but there is no indication that new divisions were created to perform the functions involved. Chiefs of the divisions and other provincial officials are appointed by the governor with the approval of the Governor-General.

(d) Provincial councils (dō-kai). The provincial council is a body advisory to the provincial governor. This council, which varies in size from 20 to 50 members depending on the population of the province concerned, has little real power. However, it does represent the first cautious step toward limited local self-government. Since 1933, one-third of the membership of each council has been appointed by the governor, and the remaining ⅔ have been elected by the members of the municipal, town, and township councils. After the elections of 1937 the members of the 13 provincial councils numbered 422, divided as in the following tabulation:

METHOD OF SELECTION	JAPANESE	KOREANS	TOTAL
Appointed	83	56	139
Elected	37	246	283
Total	120	302	422

Thus Japanese residents managed to secure 28% of the total number of seats in the provincial councils although they represented only 2.8% of the total population.

C. Local government.

(1) Municipal governments (fu).

(a) General nature and number. There are 21 municipalities *(fu)* in Korea. To become a *fu*, a place must qualify as one of "important status" by the size of its population and by its industrial and political significance. It is not easy for a Korean town to become a *fu*, and only 3 have been created since 1936, the last one being Songjin (Joshin), which won its position because of wartime industrial importance. Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul), the capital, is the most important municipality, industrially, politically, and in size of population.

A municipality is directly supervised by the provincial government and is somewhat superior in status to a county.

(b) Mayors. The mayor *(fu-in)* is appointed by the Governor-General and is nearly always a Japanese. As executive head of the city, he has considerable power; but both he and his division chiefs are subject to the supervision of the provincial governor. The mayor is ex-officio chairman of the municipal council, but a vice-chairman may be elected from among the members.

(c) Municipal councils (fu-kai). Municipal councils varying in size from 24 to 48 members are elected for 4-year terms by men over 25, resident in the *fu* at least 1 year, whose municipal taxes are 5 *yen* or more. At least ¼ of the members must be Japanese and ¼ must be Koreans. Separate schools are maintained for Koreans and Japanese, and there are separate educational committees for Koreans within the municipal councils. Although the municipal council has some voice in the affairs of the city, especially in regard to educational details, the mayor has absolute veto over its actions.

(d) Divisions. The city of Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul) had 5 divisions and sections in 1943: General Affairs Division *(Somu-bu)*; Financial Affairs Division *(Zaimu-bu)*; Educational Affairs Section *(Gakumu-ka)*; Internal Affairs Section

(Naimu-ka); Police Division *(Keisatsu-bu)*. It is probable that the administrative divisions of other *fu* are similar to those of Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul).

(2) County government (gun).

In 1943 there were 218 *gun* (counties), 114 *yu* (towns), and 2,211 *men* (townships). The area of a *gun* is fixed at about 40 square *ri* (about 240 square miles) of populated area. The *gun* is intended to have an average population of over 11,000. The *gun* and their capitals are shown in FIGURE X-13.

(a) Structure. The *gun-shu* (county head) is appointed by the Governor-General and is under the supervision of the Provincial Governor. He is the administrator and superintendent of the *gun,* and he may suspend action taken by the *yu* or *men* heads.

There is a county assembly consisting of 8 to 14 members elected by male county residents who pay taxes of at least 5 *yen.* These bodies can act only on such matters as are referred to them: legally they have little or no power, as the *gun-shu* may veto any of their actions.

(b) Towns (yu) and townships (men). The *yu* are generally of some commercial or industrial importance with populations greater than 1,500 families. The *men* differ from the towns chiefly with regard to the functions of their councils.

The town head *(yu-cho)* and the township head *(men-cho)* are appointed by the provincial governors with the approval of the Governor-General. Usually the *yu* heads are Japanese, and in 1937 only 5 Koreans were appointed for the 76 *yu* then existing. When the town head is a Japanese, a Korean vice-head is selected and vice versa. When a Korean is appointed head, the Japanese vice-head holds most of the authority, but if a Korean is vice-head, his position has much less responsibility. Members of the *yu* and *men* councils are elected by qualified voters. The qualifications for franchise in the *yu* and the *men* are in general the same as for the *fu* except that the required tax payment may be less than 5 *yen.* The *men* head on the other hand is generally a Korean. The head man of the *yu* or *men* has veto power over any action of the councils.

(c) The hamlets. The *men* are composed of small natural communities, known in Japanese as *buraku,* and in Korean as *tongnae,* the local problems of which are generally settled by a council of family heads or a leader they may designate. Minor administrative duties of the *men* are sometimes delegated to the *buraku.*

D. Japanese semiofficial control organizations.

In Korea as in Japan strong efforts have been made to organize the civilian population into government-controlled mass movements. These include industrial and agricultural organizations, youth corps for both boys and girls, and reservists' and women's associations. In addition, there are patriotic classes in municipalities, towns, and townships; the entire Korean population is organized into 420,000 Patriotic Squads; and Korean intellectuals are placed under the joint direction of the Police Bureau and the Education Bureau.

(1) The People's Mobilization League of Chōsen (Kokumin Soryoku Chōsen Remmei).

The Korean counterpart of Japan's Imperial Rule Assistance Association *(Taisei Yokusan-kai)* is the People's Mobilization League of Chōsen, with which the other mass organizations appear to be affiliated. This body attempts to stimulate loyalty to Japan among Koreans, to enlist support for the war effort, to encourage national mobilization, and to popularize conscription.

(2) The Chōsen Financial Organization (Chōsen Kinyu Dan).

The Chōsen Financial Organization is a semi-official organ for promoting Japanese financial policy. Under its auspices the Chōsen Financial Patriotic Corps has devoted itself to bolstering Korean savings drives. The members of the Corps, selected from among Korea's financial leaders, were divided into 6 sections and sent throughout Korea to the factories, mines, farm villages, fishing villages, schools, and homes to encourage increased savings.

(3) The Chōsen Patriotic Agriculture Youths' Corps.

In August 1944 it was announced that approximately 300 members of the Chōsen Patriotic Agriculture Youths' Corps *(Chōsen Nogyo Hokoku Tai)* had been studying agricultural programs in the important centers of Japan. It is probable that these youths will be used in Korea to increase the production of rice for the benefit of Japan.

(4) The Chōsen Anti-Communist Association (Chōsen Bokyo-kyokai).

Established in 1938, the Chōsen Anti-Communist Association is under the direct control of the police, with its headquarters in the Police Bureau of the Government-General and branches in each police station. Units have been organized in factories and business firms, and in 1941 the association had 150,000 members.

105. *Political Factors*

A. Attitudes toward foreign nations and foreign control.

(1) Attitudes toward Japan.

The attitude of Koreans in general toward Japan has been influenced by a tradition of past conflict with Japanese invaders, by resentment of discrimination and exclusion from a real share in home government, by reaction against the program of forced cultural Japanization, and by constant fear of the arbitrary exercise of police authority. These factors have more than counteracted in the public mind both the modernization brought by the Japanese and an administration on the whole more efficient than that existing under the Korean emperors. Such benefits as have accrued to the Koreans from Japanese rule have fallen chiefly to a small segment of the aristocratic minority, and even this group appears by no means wholly reconciled to Japanese domination.

(a) Korean independence movements. Covert resistance and sporadic revolt against Japanese control have never wholly ceased since the military subjugation of the Korean Armies and formal annexation by Japan in 1910. Encouraged by the Allied program of national self-determination in Europe, a group of prominent Koreans in 1919 addressed to Japan and to the Versailles Conference a Korean Declaration of Independence. At the same time there were unarmed demonstrations, which were suppressed with the utmost severity; the

leaders of the movement suffered long imprisonment or fled into exile, where they continued their agitation against Japanese rule. In 1929 an indecent remark said to have been made by a Japanese student to a Korean girl precipitated mass fighting between Korean and Japanese students and nationwide student strikes in the higher schools, again followed by severe police repressive measures.

Underground resistance groups are believed still to be active, especially among students and in the larger cities, where large-scale arrests are occasionally reported. These groups appear to have some liaison with exile groups. In addition, Korean guerrilla bands have been recurrently active in the mountains along the Korea-Manchuria border since 1931. Finally, agitation for Korean freedom is carried on by exile groups in China, the United States, and the USSR.

(b) Pro-Japanese elements. The interests of a few wealthy families, including some members of the former Korean Imperial Family, are inextricably tied to the Japanese rule. Many others serve the Japanese in official capacity and have received favors from them; some of these, however, have used their position in such a way as not to incur the enmity of other Koreans, and these might hope to retain some influence in a liberated Korea. This is more particularly true of those who have served in lower offices for the sake of a livelihood. Younger Koreans have been subjected to intensive Japanese indoctrination in the schools, and some of them have been educated in Japanese universities. They have in certain cases associated largely with Japanese and acquired a Japanese outlook in nonpolitical matters. A number have changed their names to Japanese forms. The general Japanese suspicion of Koreans and reluctance to accept them in positions of trust has, however, militated against genuine sympathy between the two nationalities in most cases, and whatever support the Japanese have gained is for the most part opportunistic.

(c) Attitudes toward individual Japanese in Korea. Despite the general animosity toward the Japanese Government in Korea and those, such as police and military, who have served as instruments of its oppression, there is in normal circumstances little animosity toward the Japanese farmer who has lived quietly and who has been friendly to his neighbors. In fact, it has been said that Japanese farmers might be allowed by Koreans to remain in an independent Korea. Japanese teachers and certain other professionals are, for the most part, respected by the Koreans and may also be allowed to remain. In a time of aroused feelings, however, it is probable that in any general anti-Japanese demonstration little distinction will be drawn between persons (Topic 106).

(2) Attitudes toward other nations.

Americans have been active and influential in Korea since before the annexation by Japan. Until 1941 they greatly outnumbered all foreigns except Japanese and Chinese.

The number of Koreans who have received education in the United States or in American schools in Korea, the work of American missions and hospitals, and contact with American businessmen have combined to create in the country a considerable confidence in America and understanding of Americans. Many Koreans have hoped for American help in establishing an independent government. Relations with British subjects in Korea also have been friendly, but as these have been fewer, Great Britain is less well known. Japanese propaganda attacking British imperialism in Asia has spread some distrust of British policy.

The long established French Catholic missions have introduced some degree of French influence. Attitudes toward the USSR appear to be divided. Japanese propaganda has striven to spread distrust of the USSR, trading on the imperialist policies of the Tsarist regime as well as the usual Japanese stress on the evils of Communism. However, since the failure of the 1919 independence movement there has been some tendency to turn to the USSR for emancipation; there is evidence of pro-Russian sentiment especially in the larger cities and along the northern border.

Despite the historically friendly relations of Korea and China, Korean attitudes toward China are today somewhat mixed. The Japanese employment of Korean agents in China has bred a dislike of all Koreans among many Chinese. This in turn has combined with the Korean dislike of an unassimilable minority to cause some social ostracism of Chinese in Korea. These facts have tended to counterbalance the confidence in China which the unofficial Chinese support given to the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking might otherwise create, and to sow some suspicion of the present Chinese government.

(3) Attitudes toward foreign control.

Koreans in general, both within Korea and in exile, have a strong desire for immediate and complete independence. Most of them believe in their ability to govern their country adequately and would prefer the initial inefficiencies of administrative inexperience to the danger of extended control by some successor to Japan. If Korea should be subject to foreign control, many—perhaps a majority—would favor an international regime rather than one of a single nation; if Korea should be subject to control by a single nation, there is probably a majority who would favor the United States. Korean coöperation is likely to be proportioned to Korean belief in the strictly temporary and short-term nature of such control.

B. Political groups and potential political groupings.

Since Japan seized complete control of Korea in 1910 there has been no place for legalized political parties within Korea. All the significant political groups among the Koreans have been connected with the Korean independence movement; Japanese suppression and police vigilance have forced these groups to operate underground or outside of Japanese-controlled territory. When the Japanese first seized control of the peninsula, the Korean nationalist groups moved their main base of operations to Manchuria, but Shanghai was made the seat of the Korean Provisional Government in 1919. The Korean Provisional Government now has its headquarters in Chungking, China. There have been 3 main political groups among the Koreans abroad, and they reflect in some degree similar political divisions among Koreans inside Korea proper.

(1) Groups within Korea and in the Manchurian borderland.

Because of the nature of resistance groups in Korea, it is not always possible to be sure of the present status of any one of them. The following groups, however, indicate the types of movement and their past activities.

(a) The Young Korea Academy (Hungsadan). AN Changho (C. H. Ahn) was the most powerful leader in the Korean Provisional Government and in the Korean National Association during the years 1920 to 1932; indirectly, through the Young Korea Academy, whose membership included many of the leading Koreans within Korea as well as in the United States, he extended the political influence of the Provisional Government inside Korea during those years. The Academy was devoted to advancing the physical, intellectual, and moral growth of the youth of Korea. Although it could not officially engage in any political activity, it promoted Korean nationalism in such indirect ways as the study of the Korean language and history, and by encouraging young Koreans to excel in sports. In 1937 this society was disbanded by order of the government, and in spite of the fact that most of their activities had been given official sanction by the former Governor-General, Admiral SAITO, all its leading members were imprisoned. Affiliated groups among Korean exiles continue, however, to promote the program of the movement.

(b) Socialist groups. The *"Ichi gatsu kai,"* a Korean socialist society, was secretly organized and propagated by Korean students in Tōkyō in 1922. At the same time the Young Men's Association was started in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul), ostensibly for athletic purposes. In 1924 the above two societies were combined, forming the "Korean Young Men's Union and Union of Workmen and Farmers." In 1924 all these were banned by the police and many members were arrested.

(c) Uirultan. The constantly changing underground movements devoted to anti-Japanese activity are well typified by the *Uirultan,* a secret society apparently now disbanded. It was especially devoted to the liquidation of Japanese officials. Its activities were chiefly in Manchuria but extended into Korea and Japan, with affiliations among the more radical political groups.

(d) Communist movement. A strong underground Communist party having contact with outside Communist groups existed in 1928. A Japanese Government report of 1935 stated that in spite of repeated arrests the Korean Communists still continued organization work and propaganda, and wholesale arrests of alleged Communists in Sinuiju and P'yongyang have been reported during the present war. The real strength of the Communist movement is, however, obscured by the Japanese propaganda technique of ascribing all agitation to Communist origin. Korean sources assert that there is in Korea, and not directly connected with the USSR, a strong patriotic Communist movement, and that younger Communists have carried on resistance to Japanese domination.

(e) Guerrillas of the northern provinces. Opposition to Japanese rule has continued most successfully in the 3 northernmost provinces of North P'yongan and North and South Hamgyong and in adjacent portions of Manchuria. Here the thinly populated mountainous country has facilitated guerrilla operations, and important lumber mills, mines, and transportation systems in the interior of the country have invited attack. Large bands were active here as late as 1937. Japanese military action and the scarcity of provisions have greatly curtailed their activities and numbers since then, but they continue to require constant vigilance on the part of the Japanese police.

(f) Potential class groups. Although the groups above described vary in their ideology from conservatism to communism, differences of view are eclipsed by their common struggle for Korean freedom. Certain class tensions, however, continue to exist. The economic grievance of the poorer peasantry against the landholding *yangban* class has been aggravated by the greater favor shown the latter by the Japanese. Still more bitter is the feeling of the newer class of industrial workers against the small number of wealthy Korean families who have coöperated with the Japanese in exploiting their labor. These tensions may give rise to internal political cleavages of some seriousnes when Japanese control has been removed.

(2) Exile groups.

(a) The Korean Provisional Government. The Korean Provisional Government was founded in 1919 in Shanghai after the failure of the independence movement in Korea at that time. Although the many factional differences which have divided the exile leaders since that time have caused its fortunes to fluctuate greatly, the Provisional Government now receives the allegiance of most Korean exile groups, not only in China but in other countries as well. A large share of its support is afforded by Korean groups in the United States. Since the Japanese occupation of eastern China, it has been established in Chungking; its chairman is KIM Ku, the leader of the *Tongniptang* (Independence Party). This party, of conservative leanings, has long dominated the Provisional Government.

The more liberal groups are represented by the *Hyongmyongdang* (Revolutionary Party) under the leadership of KIM Kyusik, also a co-founder of the Provisional Government. This group has had the strongest ties with the guerrilla groups of the Manchurian border.

In addition to the guerrillas operating in Japanese-controlled territory, the Provisional Government has sponsored a Korean Independence Army under the leadership of the Manchurian veteran YI Ch'ongch'on, for several years an instructor at the Chinese military academy at Lo-yang. This force has absorbed the Korean Volunteer Corps, of more liberal connections, headed by another Manchurian veteran, KIM Yaksan. It is believed, however, that its present strength is extremely small. It is under the military control of the Chinese National Military Council.

(b) Groups in other countries. In addition to the parties directly affiliated with the Provisional Government, there are active groups in other countries engaged in promoting Korean independence. Many Koreans have long lived in the USSR, and it is believed that some of these (including those of the second generation) have trained there for sabotage and other underground activities. Another exile group is affiliated with the Chinese Communists at Yenan, where it is training for political activity Koreans who have voluntarily come over or been captured from the Japanese armed forces.

Korean groups in the United States, especially in the Hawaiian Islands, have taken an active interest in the independence movement, giving financial support to the various parties and in some cases attempting to bridge their differences. The most conservative group is the *Tongjihoe* (Comrades Association) led by Dr. Syngman Rhee (YI Sungman), whose members come chiefly from southern Korea. Dr. Rhee acts as the Provisional Government's representative in the United

States. Another group somewhat less conservative is the *Kungminhoe* (Korean National Association), whose members are largely from northern Korea. The most energetic opponent of this group are the affiliates of the *Hyongmyongdang* in the United States, where they are led by HAN Kilsu (Kilsoo Haan). The *Tongniptang* is also represented by a small organization.

(c) Connections within Korea of the exile groups. The Korean Provisional Government appears to have some prestige within Korea as a symbol of national resistance. Any connections between it and internal Korea are, however, necessarily remote. Most of the present leaders have been many years away from Korea, and their activities do not appear to be very well known at home. The same is true of other exile groups. There is no reason to assume a willingness of the Koreans to accept the political dominance of an exile group, once liberation has been achieved.

C. Korean preparation for self-government.

Korea has a long tradition of self-government. During the centuries under Chinese suzerainty, Koreans in fact enjoyed complete independence in managing internal affairs. The functions of government were, however, exercised by a relatively small official class. Since 1910 all policy determination and all important administrative functions have been in Japanese hands. On the lower administrative levels, nevertheless, large numbers of Koreans have found employment. In 1936, of the 72,491 officials and regular employees in the offices of the Government-General, the provinces, and the *fu,* over ⅓ were Koreans, and Koreans are of still greater importance, both in numbers and in functions, in the lower local government units. A limited number of Koreans will probably be found able to assume important administrative positions, but they will presumably require considerable advice and supplementation on the higher levels. The appointment of a non-Korean official to a post for which a Korean is available, however, may have an unfavorable effect on public opinion.

(1) Experience in local government.

The Korean country village has continued to function under the traditional clan system, which would be little disturbed by the removal of Japanese controls. The government of the township also has in most cases remained in the hands of Korean officials. In the larger towns, and still more in the municipalities, the important positions have been in Japanese hands; Koreans form less than ⅓ of even the lower grades of municipal officials. (Topic 104, B, (2), (d)). Certain of the municipalities, such as Kaesong and Hamhung have, however, preserved a large share of the administration in Korean hands. The Korean representatives in the municipality, town, and township councils, in part popularly elected, have acquaintance with governmental affairs, although their duties have been purely advisory.

(2) Experience in provincial government.

The largest number of Koreans in government have been employed in the local offices of the Government-General bureaus and in the provincial governments. There they have actually constituted a majority among the *riin* (officials without national civil service status), over ⅓ of the *hannin* officials, and ⅙ of the *sonin* officials including judges, heads of tax offices, university professors, and provincial councillors and vice-governors. An occasional Korean of *chokunin* rank also serves as provincial governor. Koreans holding the 2 positions last named, although restricted in latitude of decisions, have gained experience in administrative procedures.

(3) Experience in higher offices.

In the more important offices immediately under the Governor-General, very few Koreans are to be found even in a subordinate capacity. Although Koreans constitute a special advisory council for the Governor-General, this is purely advisory in function and the members are chosen chiefly from among the more definitely collaborationist elements. Other Koreans in the central administration have served chiefly as interpreters, technical aides, and clerks in the office of the Governor-General and the central bureaus.

(4) Experience in nongovernmental fields.

The limited number of Koreans with experience in official administrative positions is supplemented by those who have acquired experience in other fields which may in some measure prepare them for governmental responsibility. This category includes men who have administered banks, factories, and other enterprises, as well as a considerable number of professionals, among them especially teachers and lawyers, and men with various kinds of technical training. A number of Koreans—including a large proportion of Christians—have had experience in organizing schools, colleges, hospitals, religious groups (Christian, Chondokyo, and to some extent Buddhist), and similar community enterprises. Finally, there are the groups of Korean exiles, who, while lacking administrative experience have been active in political organization, and other Koreans abroad who have acquired experience in business and professions. From the ranks of these several groups it may be possible to recruit men who, with initial guidance and aid, will prove capable of assuming greater administrative responsibilities.

(5) State of popular political preparation.

The political experience of the large body of Koreans has been limited almost entirely to restricted participation in local government of the smaller towns and townships. The activities of the various advisory councils have been too limited to afford significant political training. Korea suffers also from a long tendency toward political factionalism and lack of group cooperation. Certain other existent political factors may, however, combine with enlarged opportunity for political experience to develop an ability for self-government. Among these are the unity of language, culture, and political tradition in Korea, and the general and intense desire for national independence. To these may be added the partiality for the democratic system to be found among many Koreans educated in foreign schools in Korea or in foreign countries.

106. Security and Public Order

The Japanese police in Korea wield an authority even greater than in Japan. Their control is closely centralized, and their activities penetrate far into all aspects of the life of the people; their domain is not limited to the maintenance of civil

order and the prevention and detection of crime but extends into the field of politics, economic activity, education, religion, morals, health, public welfare, and fire control.

A. Organization of the police.

The police are divided into civil and military police, organizations parallel in function and closely integrated with each other and with the various government agencies.

(1) Civil police.

(a) Central organization. The civil police system of Korea is controlled by the Governor-General through the Police Bureau *(Keisatsu-kyoku)*. The head *(kyoku-cho)* of the Police Bureau is appointed by the Governor-General, and he in turn appoints the officials who serve under him, supervising their activities as well as those of the provincial police divisions. In 1943 there were 6 sections in the Police Bureau: the Police Affairs Section *(Keimu-ka)* with jurisdiction over routine police functions, arms, equipment, awards, and pensions; the Defense Section *(Boko-ka)* with jurisdiction over air-raid precautions, fire prevention, and flood-control; the Economic Police Section *(Keizai Keisatsu-ka)* with jurisdiction over the enforcement of price control and rationing; the Peace Preservation Section *(Hoan-ka)* with jurisdiction over thought offenses and the mobilization of labor; the Publication Section *(Tosho-ka)* with jurisdiction over publications of all sorts, motion pictures, and phonograph records; and the Sanitation Section *(Eisei-ka)* with jurisdiction over all matters affecting public health.

(b) Provincial organization. The provincial police divisions *(Do-Keisatsu-bu)* are directed by the provincial governors but also are under the close supervision of the Police Bureau of the Government-General. The administrative head of the provincial police is appointed with the approval and advice of the head of the Police Bureau *(Keisatsu-kyoku-cho)* and controls all the police in his province.

The department of police in Kyonggi province had 7 sections in 1943. These were the Special Higher Police *(Koto Keisatsu-ka)*; the Police Affairs Section *(Keimu-ka)*; the External Affairs Section *(Gaiji-ka)*; the Criminal Affairs Section *(Keimu-ka)*; the Peace Preservation Section *(Hoan-ka)*; the Economic Police Section *(Keizai Keisatsu-ka)*; and the Sanitation Section *(Eisei-ka)*. It is believed that the structure of police divisions in other provinces follows this general pattern.

(c) Police institutions and personnel. There is at least one police station *(Keisatsu-sho)* in each *fu* and *gun*. The area within the station's jurisdiction contains a number of police sub-stations *(hashutsujo)*, and each *men* has at least one police box *(chuzai sho)*. (TABLE X-10)

According to Japanese sources there were 20,642 members of the civil police in Korea in 1937, of which 12,161 were Japanese and 8,481 were Koreans. In 1938, the total had increased to 21,782 or approximately one policeman to every 1,150 people. In 1941 the total number of police in Korea, civilian and military, was estimated at 60,000.

As elsewhere in the government service, police positions, particularly on the higher levels, are largely monopolized by the Japanese.

The average police officer is of good character and is well trained, zealous, and efficient. The highest officials are often graduates of Japanese universities, and nearly all the higher ranking officers are college trained and are specialists in various fields. Inspectors and sub-inspectors have generally had middle school training. Police training schools are maintained in each province for Korean personnel and, in addition, every Japanese policeman selected for duty in Korea under-

TABLE X - 10

POLICE STATIONS AND PERSONNEL IN KOREA, 1936

Province	Offices: Police stations Keisatsu-sho	Offices: Sub-stations Hashutsujo	Offices: Police boxes Chuzai-sho	Offices: Outposts Shutchosho	Personnel: Police sup'ts** Keishi Japanese	Police sup'ts** Keishi Korean	Provincial police inspectors Keibu Japanese	Provincial police inspectors Keibu Korean	Police sub-inspectors Keibuho Japanese	Police sub-inspectors Keibuho Korean	Policemen Junsa Japanese	Policemen Junsa Korean	Total Japanese	Total Korean	Total
Kyonggi-do	25	65	172	6	1	0	46	19	89	14	1,136	1,073	1,283	1,106	2,389
Ch'ungch'ong-pukto	10	4	96	0	1	0	15	4	28	7	292	273	337	284	621
Ch'ungch'ong-namdo	14	6	162	2	1	0	20	4	34	8	457	419	513	431	944
Cholla-pukto	14	14	156	4	4	1	19	4	35	8	523	469	582	482	1,064
Cholla-namdo	22	14	222	18	3	1	27	5	50	13	754	657	835	676	1,511
Kyongsang-pukto	23	16	237	2	3	1	29	5	51	13	790	695	874	714	1,588
Kyongsang-namdo	23	23	230	12	3	1	31	6	55	12	814	701	904	720	1,624
Hwanghae-do	18	7	197	3	1	1	25	5	43	9	602	544	672	559	1,231
P'yongan-pukto	16	28	133	10	4	1	23	7	39	13	627	557	694	578	1,272
P'yongan-namdo	24	10	192	75	7	1	29	10	68	18	1,895	807	2,000	836	2,836
Kangwon-do	22	3	169	13	1	0	29	5	48	11	535	518	614	534	1,148
Hamgyong-namdo	21	18	202	12	5	1	28	7	53	15	1,020	684	1,107	707	1,814
Hamgyong-pukto	20	13	155	27	6	1	26	6	48	14	966	614	1,047	635	1,682
Total—1936	252	221	2,323	184	50	9	347	87	641	155	10,411	8,011	11,462	8,262	19,724
Total—1937	—	—	—	—	60	8	370	89	688	157	11,030	8,227	12,148	8,481	20,629
Total—1939	264	—	2,296*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

* Based on estimate of one box in each *men*.

** This does not include the superintendent of each province.

goes 4 months of special training. A school for training police officers also exists and is under the supervision of the Governor-General.

(2) Military police.

(a) Central organization. The military police *(kempei)* in Korea have their headquarters in Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul) and are under the jurisdiction of the commander of the Chōsen Army. Unlike the military police of most countries, but like those in Japan proper, the *kempei* of Korea have extensive jurisdiction over the civilian population in addition to their responsibility for maintaining order and discipline in the Army. In consequence, a member of the military police is attached to every police station and acts as liaison officer between the two organizations.

(b) Local organization. Korea is divided into 5 military police districts as follows: Kyongsong *Kempei* District including Kyonggi, Hwanghae, and part of Kangwon Provinces; Taegu *Kempei* District, including the provinces of Ch'ungch'ong-pukto, Ch'ungch'ong-namdo, Cholla-pukto, Cholla-namdo, Kyongsang-namdo; P'yongyang *Kempei* District including only the provinces of P'yongan-pukto and P'yongan-namdo; Nanam *Kempei* District which includes only the province of Hangyong-pukto and part of Hamgyong-namdo; Hamhung *Kempei* District, including part of Hamgyong-namdo and the northern part of Kangwon-do.

(c) Relations with the civil police. In theory the two police forces work in close coöperation, but in reality there is considerable jealousy between them, particularly on the part of the civil police who have no authority over military personnel and whose power is somewhat more limited than that of the *kempei.*

B. Functions of the police.

(1) General nature.

The police of Korea, like those of other countries, are charged with public safety and the preservation of law and order, including traffic control, the prevention of crime, enforcement of laws, Imperial ordinances and regulations, investigation of crimes, and the arrest of suspects. However, their authority transcends that of American police, and their activities include many functions, such as enforcement of sanitary regulations, carried out in the United States by other agencies. They also supervise public morals and thought.

(2) Political functions.

(a) Thought control. One of the most significant functions of the police of Korea is control of "dangerous thoughts" *(kiken shiso).* In Korea these include both communism and the desire for independence. Harboring thoughts hazardous to the existing order is a major offense, and police have been most diligent, even more so than in Japan, in ferreting out those individuals suspected of entertaining such ideas. Organizations and meetings are supervised by the police; every meeting must be licensed, and the delegated policemen may silence any speaker or halt any meeting without explanation.

(b) Censorship. All media for the expression of public opinion are effectively controlled through the police. All newspapers, periodicals, and books are strictly censored by the police. By 1940 it had become financially unprofitable for Koreans to edit a newspaper or a magazine, as so many editions were confiscated by the police. The newspapers were censored before publication, but this did not save the edition if a "dangerous" word could be subsequently detected.

(c) Supervision of foreigners. The police, both civil and military, regard all foreigners as potential spies and have traditionally exercised detailed surveillance over the movements and activities of foreign visitors and residents. Such persons are required to register at the local police station, where their photographs are filed and where a complete record of family vital statistics and police records of individual members of the family are kept. A foreigner wishing to travel must apply for a special permit at the home police station; and while traveling, he must be ready to present his card and answer questions at any time or place. Foreigners are known to have been interviewed by military and civilian policemen as often as 6 times on a journey of 100 miles.

(3) Apprenhension and punishment of criminals.

The Criminal Affairs Section, Police Division *(Keimu-ka)* of the Provincial Government has direct charge of the detection and arrest of criminals, and its members act in close coöperation with the commander of the *kempei* and with the chief procurator.

The police in Korea may exercise summary jurisdiction and usually do when dealing with a Korean. It is estimated that more than 100,000 cases are tried in police courts each year. In the year 1921, 73,262 cases were decided by police. Of these 71,802 ended in conviction, and against these there were only 54 appeals, of which 42 resulted in confirmation of the sentence. The chief of the police station may inflict a penalty as severe as 3 months penal servitude, but he usually imposes a fine of not more than 100 *yen* or detention for not more than 3 months. Official sources in Korea explain this system of police jurisdiction—not altogether convincingly—on the grounds of its cheapness for the defendant and of popular ignorance of legal matters. It is true that any offender dissatisfied with the summary judgment of the police department may appeal the decision. It must be noted, however, that before undertaking such an appeal a Korean has to consider his chances of acquittal in a Japanese-controlled court after condemnation by a Japanese chief of police, as well as the expenses connected with the appeal, which only the wealthier Koreans can afford.

(4) Supervision of public morals.

The police are charged with detailed supervision of public morals. Their control over all forms of public entertainment includes the censoring of movie films and designating the kind of clothes permissible for actors.

(5) Supervision of public health.

Sanitary experts and police officers act as agents for the provincial governors in enforcing food and beverage laws. The provincial sanitary section of the police is responsible for the examination and licensing of doctors, nurses, masseurs, druggists, and dealers in poisonous chemicals. They supervise the annual compulsory cleaning of individual houses and public houses, and such places as drains, wells, and dumping grounds. They also supervise hospitals and dispensaries and take charge in periods of epidemics.

(6) Fire control.

The police are charged with the prevention and extinction of fires. In all communities there are volunteer firemen working under police supervision, and at the end of 1938 there were 1,393 fire companies in Korea with 69,414 members. Flood control is also their responsibility, an important function in Korea where annual floods can be expected.

(7) Price control.

The economic police have charge of the enforcement of restrictions on buying and selling. Since the wartime economic regulations have been tightened, hoarding and black-market dealing have increased in spite of the best efforts of the economic police.

(8) Traffic control.

In the large cities the police have charge of traffic control, and policemen especially trained are to be found directing traffic on busy thoroughfares. Although Japanese are particularly efficient in this type of work, Korean policemen are more in evidence.

(9) Other functions.

The police in Korea supervise lumbering operations and the fisheries, protect the propagation of fish and other aquatic animals, and control the activities of fishermen.

C. Police methods.

The police are thorough in their methods, and as the population is not protected by the writ of *habeas corpus* or other safeguards against arbitrary action, they show little restraint in exercising their authority. Extensive use is made of interrogations, third degree, searches without special authorization, wire tapping, and informers. Both the civil police and *kempei* in the large cities employ finger printing, lie detectors, and hidden dictaphones. In addition the police keep lists of suspects, who are constantly watched or required to visit police stations daily.

The Japanese system of registration is thorough. Information on the location, activities, and history of any individual is available to the police at any time. Personal registers are kept at the police station nearest to the individual's family residence. No matter where an offense is committed or where it is tried, a record of the circumstances is transmitted to the defendant's community for notation in the family record. If anyone wishes to travel, he must secure a special permit from the station where he is registered.

Hotels, boarding houses, and houses of prostitution are required to report to the police arrivals and departures of guests and are liable to inspections at any time without warrants.

D. Attitudes of the people.

The Korean people are peaceable and have accepted police supervision and intrusion into every part of their lives. They inwardly resent police interference, but outwardly seldom make any protest as they have come to know that it is not only futile but dangerous to do so. There is very little actual friendliness between policemen and the people. Because of their arbitrary methods the police are feared and even hated rather than respected or admired. As Korean policemen have been trained to act in the same way as the Japanese policemen they are generally disliked as much, although on occasion Korean police officers will be more lenient than their Japanese colleagues if there is no possibility that their action will be observed by the latter.

E. Problems of public safety.

(1) Before occupation by an invading force.

Despite the strenuous efforts of Japanese police to uproot underground patriotic societies, there is evidence that they continue to exist in Korea. So long as Japanese military control in a given area remains secure, the completeness of Japanese police control probably will prevent such elements from combining to take effective action. If Japanese military control should be disorganized by external action in a given area, and should these patriotic groups find means of arming themselves, they may well emerge into open activity against the Japanese police and civil authorities. The Japanese police, however, will be prepared to use the most ruthless methods to suppress such activities.

(2) After occupation by an invading force.

(a) Violent uprisings. The Koreans remain as a whole generally hostile to the Japanese authorities, and acts of violence against both individual Japanese who have given neighboring Koreans special cause for grievance and also against the Japanese in general are not unlikely. Under such circumstances, Koreans would be apt to resent violently any protection afforded to the Japanese by the Allies, and immediate internment of Japanese, especially those in small towns and rural areas, may well be advisable as a safeguard against the outbreak of violence.

(b) Usability of the existing police organization. Since about half the police in Korea are Japanese and most of the Koreans in the police force are in subordinate positions or are too pro-Japanese to be trustworthy, a complete reorganization of the police system probably will be necessary.

F. The legal system of Korea.

(1) Characteristics of the legal system.

The Korean legal system closely follows that of Japan. Japanese laws are in force, supplemented by the special ordinances of the Government-General. Where Koreans are concerned, however, the laws often are applied even more strictly than in Japan proper. The individual is afforded little protection by either the law or the courts against arbitrary police action, and even the right to trial by legally appointed judges is nullified by the practice of holding suspects for long periods of time without formal charges and by the extensive summary jurisdiction exercised by police courts.

(2) Position of Koreans before the law.

The Korean suffers several handicaps at law. First, all proceedings are in Japanese, and the ordinary Korean, being seldom able to obtain competent counsel, does not have an opportunity to present his case favorably, especially if the plaintiff is a Japanese. Second, most of the cases which involve grievances against Japanese rule are never brought before a court but are judged by local magistrates or police officers of low rank. Summary jurisdiction of police officials is found particularly in those cases concerning alleged anti-Japanese political activity or sympathy for Korean nationalist groups.

Third, the treatment given Korean defendants is different from that given Japanese under the same circumstances, so that the former are at a disadvantage, particularly in cases in which both Japanese and Koreans are involved. In addition, legal penalties are sometimes greater in Korea than in Japan. The Koreans are as a rule much poorer than the Japanese but, while in Japan violations of administrative ordinances are punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 1 month or a fine not exceeding 20 *yen*, in Korea the corresponding limits are 3 months and 100 *yen*. The effects of a fine of 100 *yen* or even 20 *yen* are disastrous under Korean conditions, where the daily wage is often below 1 *yen*. Such a fine signifies economic ruin and in Japanese hands may be regarded as a potent weapon for dispossessing the native population.

(3) Courts (Saibansho).

(a) Structure. Korean courts are under the jurisdiction of the Justice Bureau *(Homu-kyoku)* of the Government-General. There is one Supreme Court *(Koto Hoin)* at Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul), and 3 Courts of Appeal *(Fukushi Hoin)* at Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul), P'yongyang, and Taegu. There are a number of local Courts *(Chiho Hoin)* with branches and sub-branches distributed as shown in TABLE X-11.

TABLE X - 11

DISTRIBUTION OF LOCAL COURTS

LOCATION	BRANCHES	SUB-BRANCHES
Kyongsong (Keijō, Seoul) District		
Kyongsong	7	29
Taejon	6	17
Hamhung	4	17
Ch'ongjin	3	9
P'yongyang District		
P'yongyang	3	11
Sinuiju	4	16
Haeju	3	13
Taegu District		
Taegu	6	17
Pusan	5	15
Kwangju	4	18
Chonju	3	11



FIGURE X - 11. *Lower court room scene.*
Two policemen seated at left.

Local courts deal with the first hearing of both civil and criminal cases. (FIGURE X-11) The court of appeals deals with appeals against a judgment of local courts, while the Supreme Court passes final judgment. In the local courts the hearing is held by a single judge as a rule. A court of appeal is presided over by 3 judges, and the Supreme Court by 5 judges. A procurator, similar in functions to an American prosecuting attorney, is attached to each court.

(b) Personnel. All judges in courts above the lowest civil service rank are nominated by the Governor-General and approved by the Emperor. Their appointments are permanent until the age of retirement. They can be removed only if sentenced to imprisonment by a court of law or to disciplinary punishment by a special commission of judges. All candidates for appointment as judges are required to be graduates of an Imperial University law school, and of blameless character. Procurators are appointed for a limited period, from among judges or practicing lawyers.

Only a small number of Koreans have been appointed to judicial position: in 1939 there were only 8 Koreans among 120 procurators and only 46 Koreans among 235 judges.

(4) Legal procedure.

In criminal cases procedure is liable to be arbitrary and long drawn out, with a protracted period of questioning both by the police and the procurators preceding formal trial. From the outset the accused is at a disadvantage, since the object of preliminary examination is to secure a confession rather than to determine facts, since legal advice is not available to him until after he has been committed for trial, since once the trial begins the defending lawyer plays a very minor role, and since the court presumes the guilt rather than the innocence of the prisoner.

(5) Prisons.

In 1938 there were 28 prisons in Korea in addition to numerous temporary jails. The number of inmates in the prisons was 19,310, of whom 18,701 were men and 609 were women. Of this total number, 18,560 were Koreans and among these at least 6,000 were political prisoners. Most of these prisons provide various types of labor for the convicts. Judged by occidental standards the conditions in Korean prisons are poor. They are always overcrowded, with discipline apparently based on the assumption that anyone getting into prison does not deserve humane treatment.

107. Tsushima

The Tsushima group, consisting of 2 main islands and adjacent islets, is administered as a part of Japan proper, under the jurisdiction of Nagasaki Prefecture. The islands have traditionally belonged to Japan. Because of their strategic position in the straits between Korea and Japan, they have suffered repeated invasion; they gave their name to the great naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War fought in adjacent waters.

A. Population and employment.

The population of the islands numbered in all 56,588 according to the 1940 census. Of these, 30,371 were males and 26,217 were females. No break-down of inhabitants by nationality is available, but because the area consitutes a fortified zone of strategic importance, non-Japanese probably are excluded. The native inhabitants speak the Japanese language

and have the typical Japanese customs, social patterns, and religious affiliations of a rural area. (JANIS 85, Chapter X, 102.)

The inhabitants are engaged chiefly in fishing, forestry, metal working (a zinc mine is reported in operation on the southern island), and in connection with the Takeshiki naval base, the Tsushima cable station, and the civil administration. Some farming is also carried on.

B. Local government and police.

Tsushima is administered under Nagasaki Prefecture, through a branch office *(shicho)* in Izuhara, chief town on Kamino-shima, the southern island. Tsushima is divided into 2 districts: the Upper District covers Shimono-shima, the northern island, while the Lower District covers Kamino-shima, the southern island. It is further divided into 1 town *(machi)* and 12 townships *(mura)*, each with its local government office. The 2 civil police stations are located in Izuhara, jurisdictional center for the Lower District, and in Sasuna, jurisdictional center for the Upper District. (JANIS 85, Chapter X, 104, 105.)

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FIGURE X - 12
JAPANESE POPULATION IN KOREAN CITIES

JANIS 75
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KOREA
JAPANESE IN CITIES OVER 10,000



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FIGURE X-13
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
JANIS 75



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